We develop a model of a multinational firm producing commodities for a global market in 8 multiple locations with location-specific risks and different regulatory standards. Salmon 9 aquaculture and disease outbreaks provide an empirically relevant example. We specifically 10 examine details of the infectious salmon anemia outbreak in Chile in the late 2000s, the multi-11 national nature of some firms operating in Chile, and the overall market structure of the salmon 12 farming industry as motivation for our theoretical model. In the model, market structure and the 13 regulatory environments in multiple countries interact to influence how intensively firms use 14 aquatic ecosystems. Downward-sloping market demand can lead to a perverse outcome in which 15 high environmental standards in one country both lower the provision of disease management in 16 the other country and reduce industry-wide output. We extend this model to consider additional 17 locations, types of firms, and within-location risk spillovers. We find that the risk of outbreak in 18 a given location is decreasing with greater firm concentration within the location, increasing with 19 the outside production of operators within the location, and increasing with lower risk (or more 20 regulation) in other locations where the operators produce. We suggest other applications of 21 multinational risk management. 
Introduction 28
Aquaculture is an increasingly important use of aquatic ecosystems. In 1970, aquaculture 29 contributed just 3% of global seafood production (4 million metric tons) (FAO, 2014) . By 2014 30 that share had grown to roughly 50% (66.6 million metric tons), and forecasts suggest continued 31 growth ( Firms compete by committing to a given quantity, as in Cournot competition. This 251 assumption seems realistic for salmon production, where quantity decisions are made two to 252 three years in advance of the harvest, creating a capacity commitment for any subsequent price 253 competition (Tirole 1988, p. 217 ). Thus, Cournot-style quantity competition unfolds at the time 254 that stocking decisions are made. 255
The expected value of a unit of planned farmed salmon production from a given location 256
These expected values are prices associated with possible market outcomes weighted by 259 probabilities of these outcomes. 260
Incentives with market power 261
A large firm with market power recognizes that its behavior can influence market prices 262 as well as a given stock's survival probability. Note that, in this context, existence of a 263 downward-sloping market demand and the potential for a firm-level quantity shock to be large 264 enough to influence the market price are sufficient for a firm to have market power. The large 265 firm has expected profits of 266
Maximizing with respect to risk reduction and production levels, the first-order 268 conditions for the choice variables in country c are 269
We do not derive first-order conditions for country n, as they are symmetric. 274
Substituting and rearranging, we get 275
The decision in (1) is to equalize the marginal cost of risk avoidance in Chile (per unit of 278 expected output loss) with the increase in the expected value of the Chilean stock, conditional on 279 survival, less the decrease in expected revenues in Norway. Similarly, the quantity decision in 280 (2) weighs the marginal cost of additional planned production in Chile against the additional 281 expected value of that production less the expected decrease in revenues for both locations due to 282 lower prices. Note that the latter two effects would not be present for a price-taker, as we see 283 next. 284 14
Incentives for a price taker 285
Suppose instead that this firm were a price taker. In this case, it does not expect to 286 influence world prices, but it has expectations about the price it would receive for its harvests in 287 each location, {} l EP . The price-taking (PT) firm has the following expected profits function: 288
In this case, the first-order conditions are simply 290 
Assuming the firm has rational expectations, the expected equilibrium price will equal 292 the expected value of output from the location, conditional on that location's stock surviving: 293 { } { }/ (1 ). 
The marginal cost of increasing the survival probability per unit of production equals the 297 expected price. The marginal cost of production equals the expected value (the price times the 298 survival probability). In essence, the competitive firm is a price-taker in the output market and 299 does not expect that it can influence the survival probability of the production of other firms in 300 its location. However, it can influence the survival probability of its own production, and it does 301 incorporate production survival probabilities of other firms in computing its expected price. 302
Comparing incentives 303
We can thus compare the two behaviors by comparing the right-hand sides of the first-304 order conditions. With respect to risk reduction, the difference between the two right hand sides 305 of Equations (1) and (3), all else equal, is (after simplifying) 306
The firm with market power has a lower equilibrium marginal cost of care. Because marginal 308 cost is increasing and convex in the amount of care a firm exerts, given its levels of production, 309 the firm with market power uses less care than it would if it were a price taker. This distortion is 310 increasing with the slope of demand and with the levels of output. It is also increasing with the 311 disease outbreak likelihood in that country's operations; however, it is decreasing with the 312 outbreak likelihood in the other country, since that increases the probability that this country's 313 harvest will generate large rents. 314
Consider now the effects of imposing stringent regulation in Norway, such as requiring a 315 minimum above what the firm would provide on its own. This latter result implies that the 316
Norwegian regulation actually exacerbates the distortion. By reducing the probability of big rents 317
for the Chilean harvest and by increasing the expected Norwegian rents in the event of a crash in 318
the Chilean stock, the Norwegian regulation tends to reduce the level of care taken in Chile. 319
Thus, given the same levels of care, the firm with market power prefers to restrict 322 production in order to raise prices. This distortion also grows larger as demand gets steeper. A 323 higher probability of outbreak in either country tends to mitigate the distortion. Consequently, 324 more stringent regulation in Norway will tend to decrease planned production in both countries. 325
In other words, part of the expected increase in output from lower risk in Norway will be 326 tempered by lower stocking levels in both countries. In essence, our problem involves two 327 market failures that interact: underproduction and underprovision of risk reduction. 328
Multi-region operators and spillovers from risk prevention 329
Now we generalize the model to include important characteristics of the risk management 330 problem for international markets. First, we consider multiple firms that may be engaged in 331 different combinations of production locations. For example, the Norwegian firm Marine 332
Harvest is the largest Atlantic salmon producer, with production in Norway and Chile, plus other 333 countries we assume are part of the fringe. AquaChile, one of the next three largest salmon firms 334 (depending on the year), has production in multiple locations in Chile but not in Norway. Small 335 producers also operate in individual locations. Second, we consider that the likelihood of disease 336 outbreak reflects collective efforts of risk reduction within a given farming location. Third, we 337 consider that baseline risk may be influenced by the total production in a given location, as 338 higher stocking densities increase the likelihood of disease transmission. With many firms 339 competing, the collective action nature of risk management, coupled with the collective nature of 340 the risky outcome of stock failure, means that small firms still exert a kind of market power. 341
Although the loss of an individual firm's production may not have a large effect on market 342 prices, the loss of the entire stock at a given location can move global prices, and all firms have 343 an influence on that risk. 344
Although one could generalize to any number of locations, three are sufficient for the 345 intuition in this case. Of these three locations, one is in Norway (n), which has stringent 346 regulation, and two are in Chile with less stringent regulation, distant enough that their risks are 347 assumed uncorrelated.
2 Let us assume that one has weakly higher baseline risk than the other, 348 such as due to different geographical circumstances. So, cH represents the Chilean location with 349 higher baseline risk, while cL represents the Chilean location with lower baseline risk. 
We define the following outcomes and their probabilities (z's): 363
Outcome (notation)
Harvest Probability (all) All sources are harvested successfully We can also write the values that can be expected to be earned from production in each 365 
These location-specific values incorporate the possible price outcomes-including zero-quantity 368 outcomes in the case of disease outbreaks-as well as the probability of survival. As such, they 369 differ from the expected price for surviving stocks, as described earlier. 
{} 0 (1 ) With respect to quantity adjustment in the low-risk Chilean location, as long as demand is 391 downward sloping, additional output will decrease prices in all states in which that stock 392
survives. An increase in a firm's production in cL raises expected global output; in turn, expected 393 global prices fall in proportion. Not only do production decisions affect price outcomes directly, 394 but they also influence risk, as The price-related changes in expected values for any given location with respect to a 405 firm's output increase in location cL are all negative (but also depend on that location's survival 406 rate). That is, an increase in planned production for cL will lower the price for all the locations to 407 the extent that it increases expected quantity. But an increase in planned production in cL also 408 increases the risk of an outbreak in cL, and that effect lowers the expected output from cL and 409 raises the expected price for all other locations. Thus, the risk-related changes in values are 410 positive for the other locations. The net effects for the other locations are thus ambiguous; they 411 will be negative as long as the outbreak risk elasticity-or the overall probability of failure-is 412 not so large as to imply that further stocking decreases expected output in that location. 413
Firm incentives 414
Firm i has expected profits of 415 , , , Norwegian production as well, further lowering its willingness to tackle risk reduction. Of 434 course, these cross-location price effects can be offset in part to the extent that the multi-location 435 23 firm is a bigger producer in cL than the single-location firm. However, it is important to note that 436 these cross-location effects are not dependent on market share in cL: the collective nature of risk 437 management essentially gives even small firms market power over global prices, since they 438 contribute equally to collective risk, and an outbreak that destroys production throughout the 439 location will have an impact on global prices. 440
Third, regulation in the foreign country (Norway) directly affects the incentives of the 441 multinational firm only. To the extent that Norway lowers its disease risk, the multinational firm 442 has even less incentive to provide care in this Chilean location. Note that other firm incentives 443 are still affected indirectly by the Norwegian regulation, because it influences the expected 444 global price. 445
Higher baseline outbreak probabilities among the Chilean locations both tend to increase 446 risk-reduction effort. Within a location, a higher probability raises the return to care. The greater 447 the probability of an outbreak in the other domestic location (cH), the less is the expected gain 448 from price compensation in the event of the loss of production in the first location (cL). 449
With respect to output in location cL, the first-order conditions for firm of type j are 450 ,,
is the area under the demand 491 curve (gross consumer surplus). Expected utility can be written as 492
Thus, expected utility has one component reflecting the expected revenues from salmon 494 production and an extra term reflecting consumer surplus. 
Substituting and simplifying, we see that at the optimal level of care, 499
Note that optimal prevention recognizes the spillover benefits to all firms producing in 501 location cL. If the salmon price were fixed (as is assumed in many common property location 502 models), the optimal level of care would simply equalize marginal costs with the expected 503 change in revenue for all production from location cL. However, with downward-sloping 504 demand (and thus concave utility), there is an added benefit to consumers from reducing the 505 probability of low-output outcomes, which tends to make the welfare-maximizing contributions 506 more precautionary. Meanwhile, the spillover effects to production in other locations are offset 507 by equal and opposite effects on consumer surplus and thus do not factor into the welfare 508 maximization. 509
In other words, even in the absence of market power among cross-location producers, and 510 even without risk spillovers within a location, welfare-maximizing prevention still exceeds 511 private provision in a multi-location market. 512
With respect to output, optimal production solves 513 , , ,
Thus, the welfare-maximizing level of production for a firm in location cL equalizes 517 marginal costs with the expected value of output from that location, less the risk spillover effects 518 for the entire location and for consumers. 519
Predictions 520
Derivation of the optimal policy reveals that there are multiple channels through which 521 risk reduction will be provided in this setting. Market power is not a necessary condition for the 522 underprovision of care, and as a result, market power is not necessary for expected production to 523 be below the social optimum. As such, empirical findings of competition in the output market do 524 not imply that industry behavior mimics the social optimum. Nevertheless, market power can 525 exacerbate distortions. 526
For future empirical work, our model generates several testable predictions regarding 527 firms' behavior and market outcomes, based on equation (5) With firm-, location-, and country-specific data on stocking densities, production, and 541 biosecurity measures, these predictions would be empirically testable. In our Norway-Chile case, 542 the model implies that Chilean locations with greater intensity of Norwegian multinationals 543 would have less prevention and higher risk, assuming low concentration within each location. 544
With high concentration in a location, predictions are less sharp because market power leads to 545 countervailing effects on care. Locations with many small producers can have higher risk if 546 spillovers are a big problem, even if the portfolio factor of multi-location production is not an 547 issue. Finally, more stringent regulation in Norway exacerbates disease risk in Chilean locations 548 where large multinational firms are significant players. This last prediction may not be 549 empirically identifiable in our particular case but may motivate empirical work in other settings 550 with multiple changes in regulations and measurable risks. 551
Discussion 552
Our theoretical model provides three key insights about disease risk, market structure, 553 and environmental regulation. First, with multinational firms, regulation in one country can 554 29 influence risk management decisions in other countries. Specifically, a tighter standard in one 555 country can induce less care in the other country. The necessary conditions for this to occur are 556 that market demand has some downward slope and there is potential for a supply disruption to 557 move the market price. Second, traditional measures of competitive output markets are not 558 sufficient to rule out market power that manifests through disease risk management. Even small 559 firms have the potential to influence global prices if their lack of care contributes to a disease 560 outbreak and major supply disruption. Third, market power is a double-edged sword. Within a 561 location, market concentration increases incentives to avoid disease by reducing the free rider 562 problem in disease avoidance. But across countries, a firm with greater market power can use the 563 highly regulated market as a hedge and has less incentive to avoid disease in the less regulated 564 market. Firms that are not multinational do not have this hedge and thus have greater incentives 565 to avoid disease. Taken together, these insights strongly suggest that the market is unlikely to 566 provide optimal disease risk management. 567
It appears likely that firms with salmon production exclusively outside Chile benefited 568 from the crisis through price compensation. However, overall production for Marine Harvest-569 the largest firm in the industry and with production in Chile, Norway, and several other 570 countries-declined by 9% in 2009 (Intrafish 2009 ). The fact that the ISA virus was traced to 571
Norway has generated conspiracy theories about deliberate introduction; we find this argument 572 unlikely. Marine Harvest was such a large producer in Chile, it would not have had an incentive 573 to induce a crash in the fish stock deliberately, even though it might have lacked sufficient 574 incentives to take care. Moreover, Marine Harvest was the first company to report ISA problems 575 in Chile. The companies with the greatest incentive to introduce a disease would be major 576 competitors with little or no production in the Chilean locations subject to the outbreak. 577 
